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Abstract
Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, gov-
ernment agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish
insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential
information. Recent work on audit games models the strate-
gic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource
and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated
well-studied security games with a configurable punishment
parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model
to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is
restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus en-
abling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide
an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution
to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main
technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of
an optimization transformation that enables the construction
of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate
that this transformation significantly speeds up computation
of solutions for a class of audit games and security games.
1 Introduction
Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, banks, social net-
works, search engines) that hold large volumes of personal
information rely heavily on auditing for privacy protection.
These audit mechanisms combine automated methods with
human input to detect and punish violators. Since human
audit resources are limited, and often not sufficient to in-
vestigate all potential violations, current state-of-the-art au-
dit tools provide heuristics to guide human effort (Fairwarn-
ing 2011). However, numerous reports of privacy breaches
caused by malicious insiders bring to question the effective-
ness of these audit mechanisms (Ponemon Institute 2011;
Ponemon Institute 2012).
Recent work on audit games by Blocki et al. (2013) ap-
proaches a piece of this problem using game-theoretic tech-
niques. Their thesis is that effective human audit resource al-
location and punishment levels can be efficiently computed
by modeling the audit process as a game between an au-
ditor and auditees. At a technical level, their audit game
model augments a well-studied Stackelberg security games
model (Tambe 2011) with a configurable punishment param-
eter. The auditor (henceforth called the defender) can audit
one of n potential violations (referred to as targets). The de-
fender’s optimal strategy is a randomized auditing policy—a
distribution over targets such that when the attacker best re-
sponds the defender’s utility is maximized. The novel ingre-
dient of the audit games model is a punishment level, chosen
by the defender, which specifies how severely the adversary
will be punished if he is caught. The defender may try to
set a high punishment level in order to deter the adversary.
However, punishment is not free. The defender incurs a cost
for punishing, e.g. punishments such as suspension or fir-
ing of violators require maintaining resources for hiring and
training of replacements. Blocki et al. (2013) provide an ef-
ficient algorithm for computing an optimal strategy for the
defender to commit to.
While this work distills the essence of the defender’s
dilemma in auditing situations, it is too restricted to inform
real-world audit strategies. In typical audit settings, the de-
fender has multiple resources using which she can audit a
subset of the targets (not just one target). Furthermore, each
resource may be restricted in the targets that it can audit.
For example, some organizations follow hierarchical audit
strategies in which a manager is only required to audit po-
tential violations committed by her direct reports. Similarly,
specialized audits are common, for example, employing dis-
joint audit resources to detect finance-related and privacy-
related violations.
Our Contributions. We present a generalized Stackelberg
audit game model that accounts for multiple audit resources
where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all po-
tential violations, thus enabling application to the practical
auditing scenarios described above. Our main theoretical
result is a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FP-
TAS) to compute an approximate solution to the resulting
non-convex optimization problem.
To arrive at this FPTAS, we begin with a simple fixed
parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm that reduces the non-
convex optimization problem to a linear programming prob-
lem by fixing the punishment parameter at a discrete value.
Since we perform a linear search over all possible discrete
values of the punishment parameter over a fixed range in in-
creasing intervals of size , we get an FPT algorithm once
the bit precision is fixed.
Next we present an optimization transformation that re-
duces the number of variables in the optimization problem
at the cost of generating additional constraints. We also pro-
vide sufficient conditions that guarantee that the number of
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constraints is polynomial in size. Significantly, these condi-
tions are satisfied in important practical auditing scenarios,
including the hierarchical and specialized audit settings dis-
cussed earlier. The design and correctness proof of this opti-
mization transformation constitutes the central novel techni-
cal contribution of this paper. Finally, we present an FPTAS
to compute the defender’s strategy leveraging the output of
the optimization transformation when it generates a polyno-
mial number of constraints.
In addition to its role in enabling the design of an FPTAS,
a practical motivation for designing the optimization trans-
formation is its promise of speeding up computing game so-
lutions using the FPT algorithm. We experimentally demon-
strate that the transformation produces speedups of up to 3×
for audit game instances and over 100× for associated secu-
rity game instances. In general, the speedups are higher as
the problem size increases.
As an additional contribution, we consider audit scenarios
where the defender can set a different punishment level for
each target instead of setting a single, universal punishment
level. We provide an FPT algorithm for this problem by
designing a novel reduction of this setting to a second order
cone program (SOCP).
Related Work. Our work is most closely related to the pa-
per of Blocki et al (2013). We elaborate on the technical
connections in the exposition and analysis of our results.
Our work is also closely related to work on security
games (Tambe 2011). The basic approach to solving secu-
rity games, and Stackelberg games more generally (where a
leader chooses an optimal strategy, i.e., one that maximizes
its utility assuming that the follower best responds) was in-
troduced by Conitzer and Sandholm (2006); it does not scale
well when the number of defender strategies is exponentially
large, as is the case in most security games. Typical algo-
rithms rely on formulating a mixed integer linear program,
and employing heuristics; these algorithms do not provide
provable running-time guarantees (see, e.g., Paruchuri et
al. (2009); Kiekintveld et al. (2009)). Often the problem is
solved just for the coverage probabilities or marginals (prob-
ability of defending a target) with the hope that it would be
implementable (i.e., decomposable into a valid distribution
over allocations). In contrast, Korzhyk et al. (2010) give a
polynomial time algorithm for security games where the at-
tacker has multiple resources, each of which can only protect
one target at a time (this restriction is known as singleton
schedules). Their main tool is the Birkhoff-Von Neumann
Theorem, which we also apply.
All our algorithms have theoretical results about their ef-
ficiency. Our optimization transformation transforms the
problem to one with only coverage probabilities as variables
and adds additional constraints for the coverage probabili-
ties that restricts feasible coverage probabilities to be im-
plementable. Thus, in contrast with Korzhyk et al. (2010)
our problem has much fewer variables at the cost of addi-
tional constraints. Also, the punishment parameter makes
our problem non-convex, and so our algorithms must lever-
age a suite of additional techniques.
2 The Audit Games Model
An audit game features two players: the defender (D), and
the adversary (A). The defender wants to audit n targets
t1, . . . , tn, but has limited resources which allow for au-
diting only some of the n targets. Concretely, these re-
sources could include time spent by human auditors, com-
putational resources used for audit (e.g., automated log anal-
ysis), hardware (e.g., cameras) placed in strategic locations,
among many other examples. The exact nature of these re-
sources will depend on the specific audit problem consid-
ered. Rather than focusing on a specific type of audit, we
denote resources available to the defender for audit as in-
spection resources. The defender has k inspection resources
{s1, . . . , sk} at her disposal, with k < n. Each inspection
resource can be used to audit at most one target. Inspection
resources are further constrained by the set of targets that
they can audit: for instance, a human auditor may not have
the expertise or authority to audit certain targets. We define
a set of tuples R such that a tuple (j, i) ∈ R indicates that
inspection resource sj cannot be used to audit target ti.
A pure action of the defender chooses the allocation of
inspection resources to targets. A randomized strategy is
given by a probability distribution over pure actions. We
use a compact form to represent a randomized strategy as
a matrix of probabilities, with pji the probability of inspec-
tion resource sj auditing target ti subject to the following
constraints
pi =
∑k
j=1 p
j
i ≤ 1,
∑n
i=1 p
j
i ≤ 1 for all i, j and
pji = 0 for all (j, i) ∈ R and ∀(j, i). pji ≥ 0 ,
where pi denotes the probability that target ti is inspected.
These constraints can be represented as grid constraints as
follows:
t1 . . . tn
s1 p
1
1 ... ... p
1
n
∑
i p
1
i ≤ 1
... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
sk p
k
1 ... ... p
k
n
∑
i p
k
i ≤ 1∑
j p
j
1 ≤ 1 . . .
∑
j p
j
n ≤ 1
Such a matrix can be decomposed into pure actions effi-
ciently. (See the full version for the Birkhoff-von Neu-
mann (1946) result presented in Korzhyk et al. (2010),
which enables the decomposition.) Furthermore, for every
distribution over pure actions we can define an “equivalent”
strategy using our compact representation: the distributions
will be equivalent in the sense that for every target ti the
probability pi that that target is inspected is the same.
Similarly to the basic audit games model of Blocki et
al. (2013), the defender also chooses a punishment “rate”
x ∈ [0, 1] such that if auditing detects an attack (i.e., vi-
olation), the attacker is fined an amount x. The adversary
attacks one target such that given the defender’s strategy the
adversary’s choice of attack is the best response.
We follow the notations of earlier papers on security
games: let the utility of the defender be UaD(ti) when au-
dited target ti was found to be attacked, and UuD(ti) when
unaudited target ti was found to be attacked. We assume
that the attacks on unaudited targets are discovered by an
external source. Similarly, define the utility of the attacker
as UaA(ti) when the attacked target ti is audited, and U
u
A(ti)
when attacked target ti is not audited, excluding any pun-
ishment imposed by the defender. Attacks discovered exter-
nally are costly for the defender, thus, UaD(ti) ≥ UuD(ti).
Similarly, attacks not discovered by internal audits are more
beneficial to the attacker, thus, UuA(ti) ≥ UaA(ti).
We can now define the full utility functions. The prob-
abilities p1, . . . , pn of each target being audited are given
by pi =
∑k
j=1 p
j
i . Then, the utility of the defender when
target t∗ is attacked is p∗UaD(t∗) + (1 − p∗)UuD(t∗) − ax.
The defender pays a fixed cost ax regardless of the out-
come, where a is a constant. The losses captured by the
−ax term includes loss due to creation of a fearful work
environment and cost incurred in maintaining a surplus of
employees in anticipation of suspension. In the same sce-
nario, the utility of the attacker when target t∗ is attacked
is p∗(UaA(t∗) − x) + (1 − p∗)UuA(t∗). The attacker suffers
punishment x only when attacking an audited target.
A possible extension of the model above is to account
for immediate losses that the defender suffers by imposing
a punishment, e.g., firing or suspending an employee re-
quires time and effort to find a replacement. Mathematically,
we can account for such losses by including an additional
term within the scope of p∗ in the payoff of the defender:
p∗(UaD(t∗) − a1x) + (1 − p∗)UuD(t∗) − ax, where a1 is a
constant. All our results (FPT and FPTAS algorithms) can
be readily extended to handle this model extension, which
we present in the full version.
Equilibrium. Under the Stackelberg equilibrium solution,
the defender commits to a (randomized) strategy, followed
by a best response by the adversary; the defender’s strategy
should maximize her utility. The mathematical problem in-
volves solving multiple optimization problems, one each for
the case when attacking t∗ is in fact the best response of the
adversary. Thus, assuming t∗ is the best response of the ad-
versary, the ∗th optimization problem P∗ in our audit games
setting is
max
pij ,x
p∗UaD(t∗) + (1− p∗)UuD(t∗)− ax ,
subject to ∀i 6= ∗. pi(UaA(ti)− x) + (1− pi)UuA(ti)≤ p∗(UaA(t∗)− x) + (1− p∗)UuA(t∗) ,
∀j. 0 ≤∑ni=1 pji ≤ 1 ,
∀i. 0 ≤ pi =
∑k
j=1 p
j
i ≤ 1 ,∀(j, i). pji ≥ 0 ,
∀(j, i) ∈ R. pji = 0 , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 .
The first constraint verifies that attacking t∗ is indeed a best
response for the adversary.
The auditor solves the n problems P1, . . . , Pn (which cor-
respond to the cases where the best response is t1, . . . , tn,
respectively), and chooses the best among all these solutions
to obtain the final strategy to be used for auditing. This is a
generalization of the multiple LPs approach of Conitzer and
Sandholm (2006).
For ease of notation, let ∆D,i = UaD(ti)− UuD(ti), ∆i =
UuA(ti)−UaA(ti) and δi,j = UuA(ti)−UuA(tj). Then, ∆D,i ≥
0, ∆i ≥ 0, and the objective can be written as pn∆D,∗−ax,
subject to the quadratic constraint
pi(−x−∆i) + pn(x+ ∆∗) + δi,∗ ≤ 0 .
Without loss of generality we will focus on the n’th pro-
gram Pn, that is, we let ∗ be n.
Inputs. The inputs to the above problem are specified in K
bit precision. Thus, the total length of all inputs is O(nK).
3 Fixed-Parameter Tractable Algorithms
In this section, we present our FPT algorithm for optimiza-
tion problem Pn, followed by the optimization transforma-
tion that improves the FPT algorithm and enables the FPTAS
in the next section. Finally, we briefly describe an extension
of our algorithmic results to target-specific punishments.
We start with the FPT for Pn. Our algorithm is based on
the following straightforward observation: if we fix the pun-
ishment level x then the Pn becomes a linear program that
can be solved in polynomial time. We therefore solve the op-
timization problem Pn for discrete values of x (with interval
size ) and take the solution that maximizes the defender’s
utility. This approach provides the following guarantee:
Theorem 1. The above approach of solving for discrete val-
ues of x is a FPT Θ()-additive approximation algorithm
for the problem Pn if either the optimal value of x is greater
than a small constant or ∆n 6= 0; the bit precision is the
fixed parameter.
Proof Sketch. The proof proceeds by arguing how much the
objective changes when the value of x is changed by less
than . The exact algebraic steps are in the full version.
We emphasize that fixing the bit precision is reasonable,
because inputs to the game model are never known with
certainty, and therefore high-precision inputs are not used
in practice (see, e.g., Nguyen et al. (2014), Kiekintveld et
al. (2013), Blum et al. (2014)).
A naı¨ve approach to improving our FPT algorithm is to
conduct a binary search on the punishment rate x. This ap-
proach may fail, though, as the solution quality is not single-
peaked in x. We demonstrate this in the full version using
an explicit example. Instead, we describe a transformation
of the optimization problem, which will enable a FPTAS for
our problem under certain restrictions.
3.1 Extracting constraints for pi’s
The transformation eliminates variables pji ’s and instead ex-
tracts inequalities (constraints) for the variables pi’s from
the constraints below (referred to as grid constraints)
∀i. 0 ≤ pi =
∑k
j=1 p
j
i ≤ 1 ,∀j. 0 ≤
∑n
i=1 p
j
i ≤ 1 ,
∀(j, i). pji ≥ 0 ,∀(j, i) ∈ R. pji = 0 .
Consider any subset of inspection resources Lwith the re-
sources in L indexed by s1, . . . , s|L| (|L| ≤ k). We let M =
OnlyAuditedBy(L) ⊂ {t1,. . . , tn} denote the subset of
targets that can only be audited by a resource in L (e.g., for
every target ti ∈M and every resource sj /∈ L the resource
sj cannot inspect the target ti) . For notational convenience
we assume that M is indexed by t1, . . . , t|M |. Then, in case
|L| < |M |, we obtain a constraint pt1 +. . .+pt|M| ≤ |L| be-
cause there are only |L| resources that could be used to audit
these |M | targets. We call such a constraint cM,L. Consider
the set of all such constraints C defined as
{cM,L | L ∈ 2S ,M = OnlyAuditedBy(L), |L| < |M |}
where S = {s1, . . . , sk} and T = {t1, . . . , tn}.
Lemma 1. The optimization problem P∗ is equivalent to the
optimization problem obtained by replacing the grid con-
straints by C ∪ {0 ≤ pi ≤ 1} in P∗.
Proof Sketch. We present a sketch of the proof with the de-
tails in the full version. As the optimization objective de-
pends on variables pi’s only, and quadratic constraints are
identical in both problems we just need to show that the re-
gions spanned by the variables pi’s, as specified by the linear
constraints, are the same in both problems. As one direction
of the inclusion is easy, we show the harder case below.
Let C+ denote the convex polytope C ∪ {0 ≤ pi ≤ 1}.
Given a point (p1, ..., pn) ∈ C+ we want to argue that we
can find values pji ’s satisfying all of the grid constraints. We
first note that it suffices to argue that we can find feasible
pji ’s for any extreme point in C
+ because any point in C+
can be written as a convex combination of its extreme points
(Gallier 2008). Thus, we could find feasible pji ’s for any
point in C+ using this convex combination.
In the full version we prove that each extreme point in
C+ sets the variables p1, ..., pn to 0 or 1. Let k′ denote the
number of ones in an extreme point. Note that k′ ≤ k be-
cause one of the inequalities is p1 + ...+ pn ≤ k. Consider
the undirected bipartite graph linking the inspection nodes
to the target nodes, with a link indicating that the inspec-
tion can audit the linked target. This graph is known from
our knowledge of R, and each link in the graph can be la-
beled by one of the pji variables. Let S
′ be the set of targets
picked by the ones in any extreme points. We claim that
there is a perfect matching from S′ to the the set of inspec-
tion resources (which we prove in next paragraph). Given
such a perfect matching, assigning pji = 1 for every edge in
the matching yields a feasible solution, which completes the
proof.
We prove the claim about perfect matching by contra-
diction. Assume there is no perfect matching, then there
must be a set S′′ ⊆ S′, such that |N(S′′)| < |S′′| (N
is the neighbors function — this result follows from Hall’s
theorem). As S′′ ⊆ S′ it must hold that pi = 1 for all
i ∈ index(S′′) (function index gives the indices of the set
of targets). Also, the set of targets S′′ is audited only by
inspection resources in N(S′′) and, by definition of C, we
must have a constraint
∑
i∈index(S′′) pi ≤ |N(S′′)| . Us-
ing |N(S′′)| < |S′′|, we get ∑i∈index(S′′) pi < |S′′| . But,
since |index(S′′)| = |S′′|, we conclude that all pi for targets
in S′′ cannot be one, which is a contradiction.
Observe that obtaining pji ’s from the pi’s involves solving
a linear feasibility problem, which can be done efficiently.
Importantly, the definition of C is constructive and pro-
vides an algorithm to compute it. However, the algorithm
has a worst-case running time exponential in k. Indeed,
consider k resources s1, . . . , sk and 2k targets t1, . . . , t2k.
Each resource si can inspect targets t1, t2, t2i−1, t2i. For
each set of k/2 resources L ⊆ {s2,. . . , sk} we have M =
OnlyAuditedBy(L) = {t1, t2} ∪
(⋃
sj∈L{t2j−1, t2j}
)
.
Observe that |M | = k + 2 > k/2 = |L| so for each
L ⊆ {s2,. . . , sk} we get a new constraint cM,L. Thus, we
get
(
k−1
k/2
)
constraints.
3.2 Conditions for Poly. Number of Constraints
Motivated by the above observation, we wish to explore an
alternative method for computing C. We will also provide
sufficient conditions under which |C| is polynomial.
The intuition behind our alternative algorithm is that in-
stead of iterating over sets of inspection resources, we could
iterate over sets of targets. As a first step, we identify equiv-
alent targets and merge them. Intuitively, targets that can be
audited by the exact same set of inspections are equivalent.
Formally, ti and tk are equivalent if F (ti) = F (tk) where
F (t`) = {sj (j, `) /∈ R}.
The algorithm is formally given as Algorithm 1. It builds
an intersection graph from the merged targets: every merged
set of targets is a node, and two nodes are linked if the two
sets of inspection resources corresponding to the nodes in-
tersect. The algorithm iterates through every connected in-
duced sub-graph and builds constraints from the targets as-
sociated with the nodes in the sub-graphs and the set of in-
spection resources associated with them. The next lemma
proves the correctness of the Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: CONSTRAINT FIND(T,R)
Compute F , the map from T to 2{s1,...,sk} using R.
Merge targets with same F (t) to get set T ′ and a map
W , where W (t′) = #merged targets that yielded t′
Let PV (t′) be the set of prob. variables associated with
t′, one each from the merged targets that yielded t′
Form an intersection graph G with nodes t′ ∈ T ′ and
edge set E = {{t′i, t′k} F (t′i) ∩ F (t′k) 6= ∅}
L← CONNECTEDSUBGRAPHS(G)
C ← φ
for l ∈ L do
Let V be all the vertices in l
P ← ⋃v∈V PV (v)
k ←∑v∈V W (t′)
if |P | > k then
C ← C ∪ {∑p∈P p ≤ k}
return C
Lemma 2. CONSTRAINT FIND outputs constraints that
define the same convex polytope in p1, . . . , pn as the con-
straints output by the naı¨ve algorithm (iterating over all sub-
sets of resources).
The proof appears in the full version. The algorithm is
clearly not polynomial time in general, because it iterates
over all connected subgraphs. The next lemma provides suf-
ficient conditions for polynomial running time.
Lemma 3. CONSTRAINT FIND runs in polynomial time
if at least one of the following conditions holds:
• The intersection graph has O(log n) nodes.
• The intersection graph has constant maximum degree and
a constant number of nodes with degree at least 3.
Proof Sketch. The detailed proof is in the full version. It is
not hard to observe that we need sufficient conditions for any
graph to have polynomially many induced connected sub-
graphs. The first case above is obvious as the number of
induced connected sub-graphs in the worst case (fully con-
nected graph) is 2N , where N is number of nodes. The sec-
ond case can be proved by an induction on the number of
nodes in the graphs with degree greater than 3. Removing
any such vertex results in a constant number of disconnected
components (due to constant max degree). Then, we can ar-
gue that the number of connected sub-graphs of the given
graph will scale polynomially with the max number of con-
nected sub-graphs of each component. The base case in-
volves graphs of degree less than two, which is a graph with
paths and cycles and such a graph has polynomially many
connected sub-graphs.
Why Are These Conditions Realistic? The conditions
specified in Lemma 3 capture a wide range of practical audit
scenarios.
First, many similar targets can often be grouped together
by type. In a hospital case, for instance, rather than consid-
ering each individual health record as a unique target wor-
thy of specific audit strategies, it might make more sense to
have identical audit policies for a small set of patient types
(e.g., celebrities, regular folks...). Likewise, in the context
of tax audits, one could envisage that individuals are pooled
according to their types (e.g., high income earners, expatri-
ates, ...). In practice, we expect to see only a few different
types. Each type corresponds to a single node in the intersec-
tion graph, so that a constant number of types corresponds
to a constant number of nodes. That is, both of the lemma
conditions are satisfied, even though only one is required.
Second, auditing is often localized. For instance, when
considering audits performed by corporate managers, one
would expect these managers to primarily inspect the activi-
ties of their direct subordinates. This means that the inspec-
tion resources (inspection actions of a manager) auditing a
node (activities of its subordinates) are disjoint from the in-
spection resources auditing any other node. Thus, our inter-
section graph has no edges, and the second lemma condition
is satisfied. Slightly more complex situations, where, for
instance, employees’ activities are audited by two different
managers, still satisfy the second condition.
3.3 Target-Specific Punishments
We present a brief overview of target-specific punishments
with the details in the appendix. We extend our model to
target-specific punishments by augmenting the program Pn:
we use individual punishment levels x1, . . . , xn, instead of
using the same punishment x for each target. The new op-
timization problem PXn differs from Pn only in (1) objec-
tive: maxpi,x pn∆D,n−
∑
j∈{1,...,n} ajxj and (2) quadratic
constraints: pi(−xi −∆i) + pn(xn + ∆n) + δi,n ≤ 0.
The naı¨ve way of discretizing each of the variables
x1, . . . , xn and solving the resulting sub-problems is not
polynomial time. Nevertheless, we show that it is possible to
design an FPT approximation algorithm by discretizing only
pn, and casting the resulting sub-problems as second-order
cone problems (SOCP), which can be solved in polynomial
time (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004). We first present the
following intuitive result:
Lemma 4. At the optimal point for PXn, xn is always 0.
Further, discretizing values of pn with interval size  and
solving resulting sub-problems yields a Θ() approximation.
The proof is in the appendix. Next, we show that for fixed
values of xn and pn, PXn reduces to an SOCP. We first
describe a general SOCP problem (with variable y ∈ Rn)
that maximizes a linear objective fT y subject to linear con-
straints Fy = g and m quadratic constraints of the form
∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. ||Aiy + bi||2 ≤ cTi y + di
In particular, the constraint k2/4 ≤ yi(yj + k′) is the same
as ||[k (yi−yj−k′)]T ||2 ≤ yi+yj+k, which is an instance
of the quadratic constraint above for appropriate A, b, c, d.
Our problem can be cast as an SOCP by rewriting the
quadratic constraints as
pn(xn + ∆n) + δi,n ≤ pi(xi + ∆i)
Using our approach (discretizing pn, xn = 0) the LHS of
the above inequality is a constant. If the constant is negative
we can simply throw out the constraint — it is a tautology
since the RHS is always positive. If the constant is positive,
we rewrite the constraint as a second-order constraint as de-
scribed above (e.g., set k = 2
√
pn(xn + ∆n) + δi,n and set
k′ = ∆i). The rest of the constraints are linear. Thus, the
problem for each fixed value of pn, xn is an SOCP. Putting
everything together, we get the following result.
Theorem 2. The method described above is an FPT additive
Θ()-approximate algorithm for solving PXn.
4 Fully Polynomial Time Approximation
Our goal in this section is to develop an FPTAS for prob-
lem Pn, under the condition that the set C returned by
CONSTRAINT FIND has polynomially many constraints.
Our algorithm builds on an earlier algorithm (Blocki et al.
2013) for the restricted auditing scenario with just one de-
fender resource. Since we solve the defender’s problem af-
ter extracting the constraints C, the variables in our problem
are just the pi’s and x.
max
pi,x
pn∆D,n − ax ,
subject to ∀i 6= n.
pi(−x−∆i) + pn(x+ ∆n) + δi,n ≤ 0 ,
c ∈ C, ∀i. 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 .
Property of optimal points. We state the following property
of some optimal points p∗i ’s and x
∗ of the optimization:
Lemma 5. There exists optimal points p∗i ’s and x∗ such that
if p∗n(x
∗ + ∆n) + δj,n ≥ 0 then p∗n(x∗ + ∆n) + δj,n =
p∗j (x
∗ + ∆j) (i.e., quadratic constraint is tight) else when
p∗n(x
∗ + ∆n) + δj,n < 0 then p∗j = 0.
Proof Sketch. The quadratic constraint can be written as
pn(x+∆n)+δj,n
x+∆i
≤ pi At the optimal point if p∗n(x∗ + ∆n) +
δj,n ≥ 0 then if we have p
∗
n(x
∗+∆n)+δj,n
x+∆i
< p∗i , we can al-
ways reduce p∗i without affecting the objective value till we
get an equality. Also, for the case p∗n(x
∗ + ∆n) + δj,n < 0
we can reduce p∗i to 0.
We focus on finding one of the optimal points with the
property stated above. Next, we sort δi,n’s to get a sorted
array δ(i),n in ascending order. Then, we split the optimiza-
tion problem Pn into sub-problems EQ(j), where in each
problem EQ(j) it is assumed that pn, x lies between the hy-
perbolas pn(x+ ∆n) + δ(j),n (open boundary) and pn(x+
∆n) + δ(j+1),n (closed boundary) in the plane spanned by
pn, x. Thus, in EQ(j), pn(x+ ∆n) + δ(j),n is non-negative
for all (k) > (j) and negative otherwise. Using the prop-
erty of the optimal point above, for the non-negative case
we obtain equalities for the quadratic constraints and for the
negative case we claim that for all (k) ≤ (j) we can set
p(k) = 0. The optimal value for Pn can be found by solv-
ing each EQ(j) and taking the best solution from these sub-
problems.
The optimization problem for EQ(j) is as follows:
max
pi,x
pn∆D,n − ax ,
subject to ∀(i) > (j). 0 ≤ pn(x+∆n)+δ(i),nx+∆(i) = p(i) ≤ 1
pn(x+ ∆n) + δ(j),n < 0
pn(x+ ∆n) + δ(j+1),n ≥ 0
c ∈ C, ∀(i) ≤ (j). p(i) = 0 , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 .
As no pi (except pn) appears in the objective, and due to the
equality constraints on particular pi’s, we can replace those
pi’s by a function of pn, x. Other pi’s are zero. Next, by
a series of simple algebraic manipulations we obtain a two-
variable optimization problem:
max
pi,x
pn∆D,n − ax ,
subject to ∀b ∈ {1, . . . , B}. pn ≤ fb(x)
0 ≤ pn ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ,
where B is the total number of constraints, which is of the
same order as |C|. The details of the algebraic steps are in
the full version.
Solving the sub-problem. Our two final lemmas are not hard
to prove. Their proofs appear in the full version.
Lemma 6. Problem EQ(j) can be solved efficiently for a
fixed value x or fixed value of pn.
Lemma 7. The optimal point forEQj cannot be an interior
point of the region defined by the constraints, i.e., at least
one of the inequalities is tight for the optimal point.
Proof Sketch. It is easy to see that if all constraints are non-
tight at the optimal point, then pn can be increased by a small
amount without violating any constraint and also increasing
the objective value. Thus, some constraint must be tight.
Algorithm 2: APX SOLVE(l, EQ(j))
Solve the problem for pn = 0, 1 and x = 0, 1
Collect solutions (pn, x) from the above in M
for b← 1 to B do
Replace pn = fb(x) in the objective to get
F (x) = fb(x)∆D,n − ax
Take the derivative to get F ′(x) = ∂F (x)∂x
R← ROOTS(F ′(x), 2−l, (0, 1))
R′ ← MAKEFEASIBLE(R)
From R′ obtain set M ′ of potential solutions (pn, x)
M ←M ∪M ′
for (b, b′) ∈ {(b, b′) | b ∈ B, b ∈ B, b′ > b} do
Equate fb(x) = fb′(x) to get F (x) = 0
R← ROOTS(F (x), 2−l, (0, 1))
R′ ← MAKEFEASIBLE(R)
From R obtain set M ′ of potential solutions (pn, x)
M ←M ∪M ′
(p∗n, x
∗)← arg maxM{pn∆D,n − ax}
return (p∗n, x∗)
We are now ready to present the FPTAS, given as Algo-
rithm 2. The algorithm first searches potential optimal points
on the boundaries (in the first loop) and then searches poten-
tial optimal points at the intersection of two boundaries (sec-
ond loop). The roots are found to an additive approximation
factor of 2−l in time polynomial in the size of the problem
representation and l (Scho¨nhage 1982). As shown in Blocki
et al. (2013), the case of roots lying outside the feasible re-
gion (due to approximation) is taken care of by the function
MAKEFEASIBLE. The first loop iterates a maximum of n
times, and the second loop iterates a maximum of
(
n
2
)
times.
Thus, we have the following result.
Theorem 3. The optimization problem Pn can be solved
with an additive approximation factor of Θ(2−l) in time
polynomial in the input size and l, i.e., our algorithm to solve
Pn is an FPTAS.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we empirically demonstrate the speedup
gains from our optimization transformation for both audit
games and security games. We obtained speedups of up to
3× for audit game instances and over 100× for associated
security game instances.
Our experiments were run on a desktop with quad core 3.2
GHz processor and 6GB RAM. Code was written in Mat-
lab using the built-in large scale interior point method im-
plementation of linear programming. We implemented two
FPT algorithms—with and without the optimization trans-
formation. For both the algorithms, we used the same prob-
lem inputs in which utilities were generated randomly from
#Resource Time (min)
Game #Target (GroupSize) T NT
Audit 100 10 (2) 12 15
Audit 200 100 (10) 81 234
Security 3,000 500 (10) 28 8,5001
Security 5,000 1,000 (20) 119 110,0001
Table 1: FPT algorithm running times (in min) with our op-
timization transformation (T) and no transformation (NT).
the range [0, 1], a was fixed to 0.01, x was discretized with
interval size of 0.005.
We ran experiments for audit games and security games
with varying number of targets and resources. The resources
were divided into equal sized groups such that the targets
any group of resources could inspect was disjoint from the
target set for any other group. Table 1 shows our results
with the varying number of targets, resources and size of the
group of targets. The results are an average over 5 runs of the
optimization with random utilities in each run. Audit games
take more time to solve than corresponding security games
with a similar number of targets as we run the correspond-
ing LP optimization 200 times (the discrete interval for x is
0.005). Hence we solve for larger security game instances.
Our implementations did not optimize for speed using
heuristics because our goal was to only test the speedup gain
from our optimization transformation. Thus, we do not scale
up to the number of targets that heuristic approaches such
as ORIGAMI (Kiekintveld et al. 2009) achieve (1,000,000
targets). ORIGAMI works by iteratively building the op-
timal attack set, i.e., the set of targets that the adver-
sary finds most attractive at the optimal solution point.
However, ORIGAMI considers only coverage probabilities
(marginals). Thus, its output may not be implementable with
scheduling constraints on resources. In contrast, our ap-
proach guarantees that the coverage probabilities output are
implementable. Wedding the two approaches to obtain scal-
able and provably implementable audit and security game
solutions remains an interesting direction for future work.
1These data points are extrapolations from runs that were al-
lowed to run 12 hours. The extrapolation was based on the number
of optimization problems solved vs the total number of optimiza-
tion problems (3000/5000 total problems for 3000/5000 targets).
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Appendix
A Birkhoff-von Neumann
For the sake of completeness, we state the Birkhoff-von
Neumann theorem from Korzhyk et al. (Korzhyk, Conitzer,
and Parr 2010), that is used to decompose the probability
matrix into pure actions efficiently.
(Birkhoff-von Neumann (Birkhoff 1946)). Consider an
m×nmatrixM with real numbers aij ∈ [0, 1], such that for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ∑nj=1 aij ≤ 1, and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n,∑m
i=1 aij ≤ 1. Then, there exist matrices M1,M2, . . . ,Mq ,
and weights w1, w2, . . . , wq ∈ (0, 1], such that:
1.
∑q
k=1 wk = 1
2.
∑q
k=1 wkMk = M
3. for each 1 ≤ k ≤ q, the elements of Mk are akij ∈ {0, 1}
4. for each 1 ≤ k ≤ q, we have: for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,∑n
j=1 a
k
ij ≤ 1, and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
∑m
i=1 a
k
ij ≤ 1.
Moreover, q is O((m + n)2), and the Mk and wk can be
found inO((m+n)4.5) time using Dulmage-Halperin algo-
rithm (Dulmage and Halperin 1955).
Clearly, our variables pji ’s can be considered as the matrix
M in the result above, and hence can be decomposed into
pure actions efficiently.
B Obtaining the two variable optimization
The optimization problem for EQ(j) is as follows:
max
pi,x
pn∆D,n − ax ,
subject to ∀(i) > (j). 0 ≤ pn(x+∆n)+δ(i),nx+∆(i) = p(i) ≤ 1
pn(x+ ∆n) + δ(j),n < 0
pn(x+ ∆n) + δ(j+1),n ≥ 0
c ∈ C, ∀(i) ≤ (j). p(i) = 0 , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 .
As no pi (except pn) shows up in the objective, and due to
the equality constraints on particular pi’s, we can replace
those pi’s by a function of pn, x. Other pi’s are zero. Denote
by c(pn, x) the inequality obtained after substituting pi with
the function of pn, x (or zero) in the constraint c ∈ C. Thus,
we get the following two variable optimization problem
max
pi,x
pn∆D,n − ax ,
subject to ∀(i) > (j). pn(x+∆n)+δ(i),nx+∆(i) ≤ 1
pn(x+ ∆n) + δ(j),n < 0
pn(x+ ∆n) + δ(j+1),n ≥ 0
c(pn, x) ∈ C, 0 ≤ pn ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 .
Observe that we removed the 0 ≤ condition in the first set
of constraints because that is implied by the next two con-
straints. Next, note that any constraint (indexed by b) with
two variables pn, x can be expressed as pn ≤ fb(x) (closed
boundary) for constraint-specific ratio of polynomials fb(x)
or by pn <
−δ(j),n
x+∆n
(open boundary). However, we close the
open boundary, i.e., pn ≤ −δ(j),nx+∆n , and solve the problem,
returning an infeasible solution in case the solution is on the
boundary pn =
−δ(j),n
x+∆n
. This is justified by the fact that
the curve pn =
−δ(j),n
x+∆n
is included in the other optimization
problemEQ(j−1), and would be output by that sub-problem
if it indeed is the global maximizer. Thus, we represent the
optimization problem as
max
pi,x
pn∆D,n − ax ,
subject to ∀b ∈ {1, . . . , B}. pn ≤ fb(x)
0 ≤ pn ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ,
where B is the total number of constraints described as
above.
C Target-Specific Punishments
In this section we extend our FPT result to target-specific
punishments. While the formulation of the extended prob-
lem is not that different, solving it becomes significantly
more challenging.
In more detail, we augment the program Pn by using in-
dividual punishment levels x1, . . . , xn, instead of using the
same punishment x for each target. The new optimization
problem PXn is
max
pi,x
pn∆D,n −
∑
j∈{1,...,n} ajxj ,
s.t. ∀i 6= n. pi(−xi −∆i) + pn(xn + ∆n) + δi,n ≤ 0
∀j. 0 ≤∑ni=1 pji ≤ 1 ,∀i. 0 ≤ pi = ∑kj=1 pji ≤ 1 ,
∀(j, i). pji ≥ 0 ,∀(j, i) ∈ R. pji = 0 ,
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 .
Note that the defender’s penalty term is now a linear combi-
nation of the target-specific punishment level.
The naı¨ve way to approach the above problem is to dis-
cretize each of the variables x1, . . . , xn and solve the re-
sulting sub-problems, which are linear programs. However,
such a discretization of size , even if yielding a Θ() addi-
tive approximation, will run in timeO((1/)n), which is not
polynomial for constant .
Nevertheless, we show that it is possible to design an al-
gorithm that runs in time polynomial in  and yields a Θ()
additive approximation, by discretizing only pn, and casting
the resulting sub-problems as second-order cone programs
(SOCP), which can be solved in polynomial time (Boyd
and Vandenberghe 2004). Letting S(n) denote the (poly-
nomial) running time of the SOCP, we obtain a running time
of O(S(n)/), given fixed bit precision.
We first present the following intuitive result:
Restatement of Lemma 4. At the optimal point for PXn,
xn is always 0. Further, considering discrete values of pn
with interval size  and solving the resulting sub-problems
exactly yields a Θ() approximation.
The proof is in the Missing Proofs section of the appendix.
Next, we show that for fixed values of xn and pn the opti-
mization problem PXn reduces to a second-order cone pro-
gram. We first describe a general SOCP problem:
max
y
fT y ,
subject to ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. ||Aiy + bi||2 ≤ cTi y + di
Fy = g .
where the optimization variable is y ∈ Rn, and all constants
are of appropriate dimensions. In particular, we observe that
the constraint
k2/4 ≤ yi(yj + k′)
can always be written as a second order inequality ||Ay +
b||2 ≤ cT y + d by selecting A and b such that Ay + b =
[k (yi−yj−k′)]T and c, d such that cT y+d = yi+yj +k.
Our problem can be cast as a SOCP by rewriting the
quadratic constraints as
pn(xn + ∆n) + δi,n ≤ pi(xi + ∆i)
Using our approach (discretizing pn, xn = 0) the LHS of
the above inequality is a constant. If the constant is negative
we can simply throw out the constraint — it is a tautology
since the RHS is always positive. If the constant is posi-
tive, we rewrite the constraint as a second-order constraint
as described above (e.g., set k = 2
√
pn(xn + ∆n) + δi,n
and set k′ = ∆i). The rest of the constraints are linear, and
can be rewritten in equality form by introducing slack vari-
ables. Thus, the problem for each fixed value of pn, xn is
an SOCP, and can be solved efficiently. Putting everything
together, we get the main Theorem 2 of the target-specific
punishment section in the paper.
D Missing Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The quadratic constraint can be rewrit-
ten as
x(pn − pi)− pi∆i + pn∆n + δi,n ≤ 0
Suppose we have an optimal point xo, poi ’s. First, we note
that if xo = 1 (resp. xo = 0) then our algorithm will find
the optimal solution exactly because x = 1 (resp. x = 0) is
one of the discrete values of x considered by our algorithm.
In the rest of the proof we assume that 0 < xo < 1. Let
′ > 0 denote the smallest value s.t. xo + ′ is one of the
discrete values of x considered by our algorithm (e.g. x0+′
∈ {i i ∈ N} ∪ {1}). We let
τ = max
{
0,max
i≤n
′ (pon − poi )
xo + ′ + ∆n
}
,
and we consider two cases.
Case 1: pon ≥ τ . In this case we set xˆ = xo+′, pˆn = pon−τ
and pˆi = poi for each i 6= n. We first show that this is a valid
solution. For each i 6= n we have
xˆ(pˆn − pˆi)− pˆi∆i + pˆn∆n + δi,n
= (xo + ′)(pon − τ − poi )− poi∆i + (pon − τ)∆n + δi,n
= (xo(pon − poi )− poi∆i + pon∆n + δi,n)
+ (′(pon − poi )− τ′ − τ∆n)− xoτ
≤ ′(pon − poi )− τ(xo + ∆n + ′)
= ′(pon − poi )
− (xo + ∆n + ′) max
{
0,max
k≤n
′ (pon − pok)
xo + ∆n + ′
}
≤ ′(pon − poi )−max
k≤n
′ (pon − pok)
≤ 0 .
Note that the loss in utility for the defender is ∆D,nτ + a′
which is upper bounded by

(
max
i≤n
|pon − poi |
xo + ∆n
+ a
)
.
That is b for a constant b when either xo is greater than
a constant or ∆n 6= 0. Observe that due to the fixed bit
precision assumption ∆n 6= 0 implies ∆n is greater than
a constant. We remark that the solution returned by our
algorithm will be at least as good as the solution given
by xˆ and pˆi’s because xˆ is one of the discrete values of
x considered. Thus, the defender’s utility in the solution
given by our algorithm is θ()-close to the defenders utility
in the optimal solution.
Case 2: pon < τ . In this case we set pˆn = 0, xˆ = xo + ′
and pˆi = poi for each i 6= 0. We first show that this is a valid
solution. For each i 6= n we have
xˆ(pˆn − pˆi)− pˆi∆i + pˆn∆n + δi,n
= (xo + ′)(pon − pon − poi )− poi∆i + (pon − pon)∆n + δi,n
= (xo(pon − poi )− poi∆i + pon∆n + δi,n)
+′(−poi )− xpon − pon∆n
≤ 0 .
Note that the loss in utility for the defender is at most
∆D,nτ + a
′ which is upper bounded by

(
max
i≤n
|pon − poi |
xo + ∆n
+ a
)
.
That is b for a constant b. We again remark that the solu-
tion returned by our algorithm will be at least as good as the
solution given by xˆ and pˆi’s because xˆ is one of the discrete
values of x considered. Thus, the defender’s utility in the
solution given by our algorithm is θ()-close to the defend-
ers utility in the optimal solution.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the optimization objective de-
pends on the variables pi’s only, and the quadratic con-
straints are same in both problems we just need to show that
the regions spanned by the variables pi’s, as specified by the
linear constraints, are the same in both problems.
First, let pi’s, p
j
i ’s belong to region given by the grid con-
straints. Then, by the definition of C, for any cML we know
M is audited only by L. Thus, for i ∈ {t1, . . . , t|M |} the
variables pji are non-zero only when j ∈ {s1, . . . , s|L|}.
Therefore,∑
i∈{t1,...,t|M|}
pi ≤
∑
i∈{t1,...,t|M|}
∑
j∈{s1,...,s|L|}
pji ≤ |L|
Hence, pi’s satisfies all constraints in C∪{0 ≤ pi ≤ 1}, and
therefore pi’s belong to region given by C ∪ {0 ≤ pi ≤ 1}.
Next, let pi’s belong to region given byC∪{0 ≤ pi ≤ 1}.
We first show that the extreme points of the convex polytope
given by C ∪ {0 ≤ pi ≤ 1} sets the variables p1, . . . , pn to
either 0 or 1.
Extreme points 0/1
We prove this result with additional (redundant) con-
straints in C. These redundant constraints are the ones that
were dropped due to |L| ≥ |M |. As these constraints are re-
dundant, the polytope with or without them is same, and so
are the extreme points. Thus, for this part (extreme points)
we assume C includes these redundant constraints.
We will do this by induction on the size of the restricted
set R. The base case is when |R| = 0, then the only con-
straint in C is
∑
i pi ≤ k, i.e., AC is ~1. It can be checked
directly the extreme points have k ones and other zeros.
Next assume the result holds for allRwith |R| = w. Con-
sider a restriction R with |R| = w + 1. Choose any particu-
lar restriction, say (j, i) ∈ R. Suppose when this restriction
does not exist, we have the restriction R′ = R\(j, i) of size
w and by induction hypothesis with R′ the extreme points
are 0/1. We proceed to do the induction by checking how
the constraint set C and C ′ differ.. We divide the proof into
two cases.
Case 1 First, suppose with restriction R′, ti could be in-
spected only by kj , then with R, ti is not inspected at all.
Recall that any constraint cM,L denotes a set of resources
L and targets M such that the targets are inspected only by
resources. We construct the set of constraints C and C ′ by
iterating through all subsets of resources. If for any subset
of resources L, kj /∈ L then the set of targets inspected only
by L does not include ti for both R and R′ and is the same
set for both R and R′. Thus, cM,L ∈ C and cM,L ∈ C ′ and
pi does not show up in these constraints. On the other hand,
if kj ∈ L, then for R we have ti /∈ M but for R′ we have
M ′ = M ∪ ti. Thus, for such a subset L we know that
• (differ1) C and C ′ include these constraint with the dif-
ference that cM ′,L has the additional variable pi on the
LHS.
Thus, the constraints C are formed from constraints C ′ by
setting pi = 0. But, setting pi = 0 is the intersection of
pi = 0 and the polytope given by C ′. pi = 0 is a k − 1-face
of the polytope given by C ′. Thus, the extreme points of this
intersection polytope must be a subset of extreme points of
polytope given by C ′ and hence integral.
Case 2 In the second case with restriction R′, ti is in-
spected by at least one resource other than kj , then with re-
striction R, ti is still inspectable. Let the set of resources
that can inspect ti with restriction R be Ki. We construct
the set of constraints C and C ′ by iterating through all sub-
sets of resources. If for any subset of resources L, kj /∈ L
then there are two cases possible:
• Ki ⊆ L which implies ti ∈ M and ti /∈ M ′ and M =
M ′ ∪ ti. For this scenario we know that
– (differ2) C ′ and C both include these constraint with
the difference that cM,L has the additional variable pi
on the LHS.
• Ki * L which implies ti /∈ M and ti /∈ M ′, i.e., the set
of targets inspected only by L is same for both R and R′
On the other hand, if kj ∈ L, then there are two cases possi-
ble:
• Ki ⊆ L which implies ti ∈ M and ti ∈ M ′, i.e., the set
of targets inspected only by L is same for both R and R′.
• Ki * L which implies ti /∈ M and ti /∈ M ′, i.e., the set
of targets inspected only by L is same for both R and R′
For the cases where the set of targets inspected is same for
both R and R′, as argued earlier, cM,L ∈ C and cM,L ∈ C ′.
Thus, the only scenario to reason about is differ2. We do
a step-by-step proof, by modifying constraints in C ′ one by
one to obtain the constraints C, in the process showing for
each step that the extreme points are 0/1. Thus, at each step
we modify the polytope with 0/1 extreme points (say Rl)
given by Cl to obtain the polytope (Rl+1) given by Cl+1 by
modifying one constraint c that did not have pi on the LHS
to one c+pi that has pi on the LHS. Clearly, Rl+1 ⊆ Rl.
First, we take care of some trivial cases. If the constraints
c+pi is redundant (then ci must also be redundant) then it
does not contribute to extreme points. Thus, the relevant
case to consider is when c+pi is not redundant.
Now, we need to only consider those extreme points that
lie on the constraint c+pi , as the other extreme points for
Rl+1 will be same as forRl and hence integral. Consider the
extreme point p∗ that lies on the constraint c+pi . Wlog, let
the variables in c+pi be p1, . . . , pi. We must have
∑i
1 pj =|L|. Now, from the polytope Rl remove all extreme points
that have
∑i
1 pj = |L|+1, and consider the convex hullR−l
of remaining extreme points. Note that all extreme points of
R−l are inRl+1, thusR
−
l ⊆ Rl+1. There could be two cases:
one if there are no extreme points with
∑i
1 pj = |L| + 1 in
Rl, then Rl = R−l ⊆ Rl+1, and since Rl+1 ⊆ Rl we get
Rl = Rl+1. Thus, all extreme points of Rl+1 will be 0/1.
The second (more interesting case) is when there are ex-
treme points in Rl with
∑i
1 pj = |L| + 1 that get removed
in R−l . Since p
∗ is a point in Rl it can be written as convex
combination of extreme points. If all these extreme points
satisfy
∑i
1 pj ≤ |L|, then p∗ can be written as convex com-
bination of extreme points of R−l and since R
−
l ⊆ Rl+1, p∗
cannot be a extreme point. Or else, if one of the extreme
points (in the convex combination) P has
∑i
1 pj = |L| + 1
with ps = 1 (1 ≤ s ≤ i) then we can write P as sum
of two points within R−l : one which is same as P except
ps = 0, and other in which only ps = 1 and other com-
ponents are zero. It is easy to check that these points are
in R−l , since the inequalities allow for reducing any pj and
clearly
∑i
1 pj ≤ |L|. In such a manner, we can ensure that
all extreme points involved in the convex combination have∑i
1 pj ≤ |L|, which reduces to the previous case.
Extreme points are pure strategies
Next, it is easy to see that for given pi’s and p∗i ’s, with cor-
responding feasible pji ’s and p
∗j
i ’s, any convex combination
p@i ’s of pi’s and p
∗
i ’s has a feasible solution p
@j
i ’s which is
the convex combination of pji ’s and p
∗j
i ’s. Since, any point
in a convex set can be written as the convex combination of
its extreme points (), it is enough to show the existence of
feasible pji ’s for the extreme points in order to prove exis-
tence of feasible pji ’s for any point in the convex polytope
under consideration.
The extreme points of the given convex polytope has ones
in k′ ≤ k positions and all other zeros. The k′ ≤ k arises
due to the constraint p1 + . . .+ pn ≤ k. Consider the undi-
rected bipartite graph linking the inspections node to the tar-
get nodes, with a link indicating that the inspection can audit
the linked target. This graph is known from our knowledge
of R, and each link in the graph can be labeled by one of
the pji variables. Let S
′ be the set of targets picked by the
ones in any extreme points. We claim that there is a per-
fect matching from S′ to the the set of inspection resources
(which we prove in next paragraph). Given such a perfect
matching, assigning pji = 1 for every edge in the matching
yields a feasible solution, which completes the proof.
We prove the claim about perfect matching in the last
paragraph. We do so by contradiction. Assume there is no
perfect matching, then there must be a set S′′ ⊆ S′, such
that |N(S′′)| < |S′′| (N is neighbors function, this state-
ment holds by the well known Hall’s theorem). As S′′ ⊆ S′
it must hold that pi = 1 for all i ∈ index(S′′) (function
index gives the indices of the set of targets).. Also, the set of
targets S′′ is audited only by inspection resources in N(S′′)
and, by definition of C we must have a constraint (the func-
tion index gives the set of indices of the input set of targets)∑
i∈index(S′′)
pi ≤ |N(S′′)| .
Using, |N(S′′)| < |S′′|, we get∑
i∈index(S′′)
pi < |S′′| .
But, since |index(S′′)| = |S′′|, we conclude that all pi for
targets in S′′ cannot be one, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume constraint c is in the output
of the naive algorithm. Restrict the constraint c to be a
non-implied constraint, i.e., if c is given by LHS(C) ≤
RHS(c) then it cannot be written as
∑n
i=1 LHS(ci) ≤∑n
i=1RHS(ci) for any c1, . . . , cn. Note that such a restric-
tion does not change the region defined by the set C. By
the description of the naive algorithm, this constraint must
correspond to a set of inspection resources, say S, and the
set of targets TS inspected only by inspection resources in
S, and there exists no subset of TS and S such that the sub-
set of targets is inspected only by the subset of inspection
resources. The constraint c is of the form P (TS) ≤ |S|,
where P (TS) is the sum of the probability variables for tar-
gets in TS . Now, for the intersection graph representation,
every node x represents targets that are inspected by a given
subset xs of inspection resources. For our case, we claim
that every t ∈ TS is either equivalent to or linked to an-
other target in TS , otherwise we have the subset {t} ⊂ S
inspected only by ts ⊂ TS . Thus, the targets in TS form
a connected induced sub-graph. Thus, we conclude that the
CONSTRAINT FIND algorithm will consider this set of tar-
gets and find the non-implied constraint c.
Next, assume that CONSTRAINT FIND finds a con-
straint c. As this corresponds to a connected induced sub-
graph (with targets as nodes), we obtain a set of targets T
and a set of inspection resources ∪t∈TF (t) such that targets
in T are audited by ∪t∈TF (t) only. Thus, by definition of
the construction of c, this constraint is same as the constraint
c′ obtained by the naive algorithm when it considers the set
∪t∈TF (t). That is, c will also be found by the naive algo-
rithm.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof below lists sufficient condi-
tions under which the number of induced connected sub-
graphs is polynomial is size. The proofs are constructive
also, allowing extracting these sub-graphs in polynomial
time.
• Graphs with O(log n) nodes. The maximum number of
connected induced subgraphs in a graph with t nodes is 2t
(take any subset of vertexes). Thus, clearly a graph with
O(log n) nodes will have polynomially many connected
sub-graphs.
• Graphs with constant max degree and constant number
of nodes with degree ≥ 3. The number of connected
induced subgraphs in a tree with max degree d and t
vertexes with degree ≥ 3 is bounded from above by
2(2(d+1))
t+1
n(d+1)
t+1
. To prove this result, denote by
T (n, d, t) the worst case number of connected induced
sub-graphs in a graph with n vertices, and max degree
d and t vertices with degree ≥ 3.
Remove a vertex X with degree ≥ 3 to get k ≤ d dis-
connected components. Each connected sub-graph in any
component that was linked to X could be combined with
any connected sub-graph of any other component linked
to X , yielding a new connected sub-graph. Thus, consid-
ering every subset of the k components, we get
T (n, d, t) ≤ 2k (T (n− 1, d, t− 1))k
Observing that k < d + 1, and T (n − 1, d, t − 1) ≤
T (n, d, t− 1) we get
T (n, d, t) ≤ (2T (n, d, t− 1))d+1
Thus, we see that T (n, d, t) = 2(2(d+1))
t+1
(n)(d+1)
t+1
satisfies the above equation.
As part of the induction, the base case requires reasoning
about a graph with max degree either 1 or 2 (t = 0, d = 1
or 2). Thus, we need to show that the connected sub-
graphs is less than nd+1, which is n2 for max-degree 1
and n3 for max-degree 2. The max-degree 1 case is triv-
ial. For the max-degree 2 case, such graphs can be decom-
posed efficiently into paths and cycles, and the number of
connected sub-graphs on cycles and paths is less that n2.
Proof of Lemma 4. First, assume poi ’s and x
o
i ’s are an opti-
mal point of PXn. If xon > 0 then reducing the value of
xon always yields a feasible point, as the quadratic inequal-
ity is still satisfied. Also, clearly reducing xon increases the
objective value. Thus, we must have xon = 0.
Next, reducing the value of pon by p (≤ ) always yields
a feasible point, as the quadratic inequality is still satisfied
and so are the linear inequalities. The values of p are chosen
so that the new values of pn lie on our discrete grid for pn.
Thus, the new feasible point F is poi ’s for i = 1 to n−1, xoi ’
for i = 1 to n− 1 and pn = pon − p, xn = 0. The objective
at this feasible point F is off from the optimal value by a
linear combination of p with constant coefficients, which
is less than a constant times . Then, the SOCP with the
new values of pn yields an objective value at least as high as
the feasible point F on the grid. Thus, using our approach,
we obtain a solution that differs from the optimum only by
Θ().
Proof of Lemma 5. observe that the quadratic inequality can
be rewritten as
pn(x+ ∆n) + δi,n ≤ pi(x+ ∆i) .
Suppose is an optimal point, and suppose for some j we have
the strict inequality
p∗n(x
∗ + ∆n) + δj,n < p∗j (x
∗ + ∆j) .
Let p′j = min(0,
p∗n(x
∗+∆n)+δj,n
x∗+∆j
). Then, we claim that
p∗1, . . . , p
∗
j−1, p
′
j , p
∗
j+1, p
∗
n, x
∗ is also an optimal point. This
is easy to see since decreasing pj is not restricted by any
inequality other than the quadratic inequality and the objec-
tive only depends on pn. As a result, we can restrict the
problem to be equalities for all those quadratic constraints
for which p∗n(x
∗ + ∆n) + δj,n ≥ 0, and restrict pj = 0 in
case p∗n(x
∗ + ∆n) + δj,n < 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. The fixed x case is obvious, since the
problem is a linear program for fixed x. The fixed pn case
is equivalent to minimizing x with constraints that are of the
form f(x) ≤ 0, where f is a polynomial in x. For any poly-
nomial constraint f(x) ≤ 0, it is possible to approximate the
roots of the polynomial with an additive approximation fac-
tor of 2−l (Scho¨nhage 1982) and hence find the intervals of x
that satisfies the constraint f(x) ≤ 0 within additive approx-
imation factor of 2−l. Doing so for the polynomially many
constraints and finding the intersection of intervals yields the
minimum value of x with additive approximation factor of
2−l that satisfies all constraints.
UaD U
u
D U
a
A U
u
A
0.614 0.598 0.202 0.287
0.719 0.036 0.869 0.999
0.664 0.063 0.597 0.946
0.440 0.322 0.023 0.624
0.154 0.098 0.899 0.902
0.507 0.170 0.452 0.629
0.662 0.371 1.000 0.999
Table 2: Utility values for the counterexample
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Figure 1: Variation of maximum utility with x showing mul-
tiple peaks.
Proof of Lemma 7. We can derive an easy contradiction for
this scenario. Assume p∗n, x is optimal. As fb is continuous
in x, if all inequalities are strict, then it is possible to increase
the value of optimal p∗n by a small amount, without violating
the constraints. Clearly, this increased value of pn results in
a higher objective value, contradicting the assumption that
p∗n, x
∗ is optimal.
E Maximum Value of Objective is Not
Single-peaked
As stated above, the solution of the optimization problem
is not single peaked in punishment x. Here we show the
counterexample that proves this fact. We choose a problem
instance with just one defender resource and 7 targets, and
we consider only the case when the seventh target is the tar-
get under attack. The value of a was chosen to be 0.01, and
x was discretized with interval size of 0.005. The various
values of utilities are shown in Table 2. The variation of
maximum utility with x is shown in Figure 1. It can be seen
that the maximum value is not single peaked in x.
F Model enhancement.
We state an extension to the model that captures immediate
losses that the defender suffers by imposing a punishment,
for example, firing or suspending an employee requires time
and effort to find a replacement. Mathematically, we can
account for such loss by including an additional term in the
objective of our optimization:
pn(∆D,n − a1x)− ax
where−a1x captures the loss from imposing punishment. It
is not hard to check that we still get a FPT with the above
objective. The reason for that is as because for any discrete
change  in x, the term −pna1x changes by at max θ()
amount given constant bit precision.
We also still get the same FPTAS result by a minor modi-
fication to Lemma 5. In that lemma, we need to consider the
case of ∆D,n − a1x < 0 separately, and it is not too hard to
see that in this case the optimal pn is 0. We can solve this
case of pn = 0 using Lemma 6.
For target-specific punishment the objective would
change to
pn(∆D,n − a′nxn)−
∑
j∈{1,...,n}
ajxj
Again, using the exact same argument as in Lemma 4, it
is not hard to see that at the optimal point xn should be 0.
Once xn is 0, the objective is linear in the variables and we
can apply the same SOCP reduction as earlier.
